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MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY 

FOREWORD 
Having brought forth pamphlets dealing with various 
historical aspects of the Manchurian crisis, it has been 
-considered advisable to print for purposes of reference 
.an English version of the statement given out by the 
War Office about the origin and progress of the 
unfortunate military clash. What is stated as to the 
origin of the trouble confirms and supplements the 
.argument advanced on the same subject in the other 
publications of ·the present series. 
MOTOSADA ZUMOTO 
Tokyo, November, 1931. 

One of the inspired poste1·s plastered on a wall in 
the military barracks at Peitaiying, near M~tkden. 
It reads : " Keep a watch at the railway to the 
west of our ban·acks." 
Srmw of the anti-J apanese posters put on the streets. T he left cut gives a chronological 
record of " Chinese Political H istory of J apanese Invasion." The picture on the right 
hand side shows Chinese "sweeping national humiliations" out of their lwuse. 
A pair of inflammatory posters put up on the street. The pictu?·e on the left side shows 
a Korean entering Chinese territory at the point of the Japaese bayonelt. The drawing 
on the ?·ight shows the massac1·e of Chinese people by both Japanese and Koreans. 

MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY 
(Unofficial Translation of Statement Issued by the War Office) 
L EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT 
The Chinese policy toward Japan is best to be seen 
in the light of a series of more than 300 cases or 
incident that have featured the intercourse between the 
two nations during the past few years. Of the more 
recent incidents, mention may be made of the question 
of agrement concerning the appointment . of Japanese 
minister to China, the maltreatment of Korean farmers 
in the region of W anpaosban, mob assaults upon 
Japanese population at Tsingtau, and the killing of 
Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers, all of which are 
.still fre h in our minds. In l\Ianchuria alone no less 
than a dozen of such incidents have been noted within 
a period of but three months after July of this year. 
Among these may be noted such cases as the wanton 
detention of Japanese patrol soldiers by 50 Chinese police 
officers ; Chinese soldiers firing upon Japanese guards 
cau ing the loss of a life ; Chinese bandits attacking 5 
.Japanese patrol soldiers, killing one of them. In more 
than a dozen other cases the Japanese civilian population 
were subjected to persecution or humiliation of one sort 
or another. Minor cases of open contempt or provocation 
in which not only civilians but soldiers of Japan have 
figured are almost numberless. 
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Such attitude of Chinese mind is to be traced to the 
fundamental idea of the "recovery of national rights," 
which has been the keynote of China's foreign policy. 
The Three People's Principles of the late Sun Yat-sen, 
the abrogation .of unequal treaties as expounded by the 
Kuomintang and the general anti-Imperialistic sentiment 
form the basis upon which the whole Chinese mentality, . 
official and individual, bas in recent years been shaped. 
All institutions of learning, from colleges- down to 
elementary schools, employ text-books carrying expressions 
of contempt or hostility to Japan, or verses of the same 
tenor which young scholars are taught to sing. Military 
institutions overlook no opportunity to spread the same 
feeling in the ranks. An extreme instance in the case 
was seen when the soldiers at drill, ordered to number 
off, gave an expression for "Down with Japan I " instead 
of numbers. This is certainly a form of military training 
with Japan as China's national enemy. 
In the field of civil administration, likewise, the 
National Government has been responsible for a number 
of legislative and other acts plainly aimed against Japan. 
Existing treaty commitments have often been ignored. 
Attempts have been made to nullify existing agreements 
with Japan, by purposely evading the issues on the 
pretext of internal troubles. To the end of nullifying 
the agreement as to the question of land lease in Man-
churia, the Chinese authorities have issued laws whereby 
any one leasing land to a Japanese may be declared aa 
punishable by death, and no mortgage held by a 
Japanese subject is to receive official recognition. 
Orders have also been issued to cancel all contracts with 
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Japanese people for lease of houses. A special Commis-
sion has been organized on the professed ground of 
guarding against "unpatriotic sales of land." In open 
violation of the treaties, the governors of provinces have 
been ordered to stop trading in Japanese goods. Japan-
ese subjects have been refused official permits for inland 
travels. No opportunity has been suffered to pass with-
out being turned to the furtherance of the anti-Japan-
ese cause. This sentiment of hostility is now reflected 
even in the address which common Chinese people adopt 
in daily conversations with Japanese. Where a Japanese 
was once addressed with all respect due to a person of 
social respectability is now often addressed in the low 
jargon of the street. 
Nor does the same spirit fail to display itself among 
Chinese officials. Dr. Wang Chen-ting, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, speaking before Kuomintang members 
at Nanking in February of this year, was reported to 
have openly expressed himself to the effect that, should 
Japan oppose Chinese recovery of national rights, all 
that China had to do would be to settle the matter by 
the grim methods of war. Again, on another public 
occasion last August, the same Chinese statesman boldly 
discussed possibilities of driving Japanese population out 
of Manchuria by warlike methods. Chinese officials, 
military and others, have of late spoken muGh about the 
superiority of their soldiers, pointing out the actual 
training and abundant experience they have acquired on 
the field of battle. They have always referred in a 
contemptuous vein to the Japanese soldiers as men with-
out experience of actual warfare. Such remarks, because 
often heard not ronly in military but also other official 
quarters, gained wide currency. 'rhe anti-Japanese attitude 
of a negative character was thus gradually turned into 
one of open contempt and defiance. When such a spirit 
was openly encouraged and was so widely at work, it 
was unavoidable that a dangerous situation should be 
precipitated. 
Several days before the hostilities broke out in Man-
churia, General Wang I-che, Commander of the Chinese 
Brigade at Peitaiying, wbi~h was to become the centre 
of military operations in the present Mukden Qampaign, 
was quoted as having said in the course of a speech on 
the Manchurian situation, that he would be proud to 
follow the example of General Han Kwang-yung, who 
was the author of the Sino-Soviet hostilities of 1930, 
dying on the field of battle. There were current at the 
time among the Chinese population rumours of " an 
imminent expulsion of the Japanese influence" and 
frequent talks of the " approach of hostilities to be 
launched by Chinese troops in South Manchuria." 
All this by way of showing the attitude of provacative 
hostility that the Chinese people had been showing in 
China in general, and in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia 
in particular, wherever they came in touch with Japa-
nese interests. It was inevitable, under the circumstances, 
that both the Chinese and Japanese people should come 
to confront one another with a sharpened sense of anta-
gonism. Fear of an outbreak of some sort had been fast 
growing in many quarters, when the attack of Chinese 
soldiers on the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden 
at last threw fat intq the long smouldering fire. 
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Col. Doihara, who was for a time in charge of civil administration in Mukden_.. 
organized a medical clinic to administer help to the native 
civilians abandoned in their sick-beds. 
Almost at the first shot fired, Chinese physicians fled dese1·ting their patients 
in hospital. These civilian patients were 1·emoved to the Japan 
R ed Cross Hospital at the first opportunity. 

The scarcity of foodstu.tfs became one of the first pressing questions after hostilities ceased 
in Mukden. Col. Doiha1·a arranged with religious organizations for free 
distribution of foodstuffs among the poorer classes of Chinese. 
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II. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 
What gave rise to hostilities near Mukden, wa an 
incident in itself very simple. On the night of eptem-
ber 18 about 10.30 p.m., two or three companies of 
Chinese soldiers, under direction of a Chinese officer, 
destroyed the track of the South Manchuria Railway at 
a point to the southwest of the C_hinese military barracks 
at Peitaiying where some 7,000 of soldiers were quartered 
under command of General Wang, Commander of the 
Brigade. These soldiers, having opened fire upon the 
Japanese soldiers who happened to be patroling the rail-
way, proceeded toward Liutianghu where a Japanese detach-
ment was statioued. Upon the report of this, a company 
of Japanese railway guards at the Hushihtai hastened to 
the aid, following the railway line to the south. The 
Chinese soldiers retired into the barracks at Peitaiying 
from the southwest side. The Japanese soldiers in pur-
suit pushed their way to get into the barracks from the 
same direction until they were brought to a sharp stop 
by a strong fire directed from inside the barracks. The 
Japanese company, having occupied a corner on the 
barrack grounds, opposed the Chinese soldiers who were 
soon reinforced by machine guns, infantry and artillery. 
Consequently, the Japanese found themselves in difficulty, 
Lieutenant Noda falling in the action, until a reinforce-
ment from the Second Battalion of Rail way Guards at 
Mukden arrived under command of Lieut.-Colonel Shima-
moto. These combined forces drove the Chinese soldiers 
out of Peitaiying toward the daybreak. Inside the 
banacks large quantities of cartridges and hand grenades 
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were discovered lying about almost evefY\Vhere. This is 
a significant circumstance, because it is a rule in the 
Chinese army never to supply men with these things 
except at time of ·war . . 
The 29th Regiment of Japanese Infantry under com-
mand of Colonel Hirata stationed in the railway zone 
near Mukden, and in proximity with the Chinese troops 
stationed thereabout to .the number of some 14,000 men, 
was naturally apprised of the above incident with little 
delay. The Regiment was at once put into action 
against the Chinese troops within the walled city of 
Mukden. 
Lieut.-General Tamon, Commander of the Second 
Division stationed at Liaoyang, issued an order at 1 a.m. 
for a concentration of the main force near Mukden. 
(Note : The Chinese troops under Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang numbered 330,000, consisting of 250,000 
regulars and 80,000 irregulars. Of these men 110,000 
were away on an expedition beyond Shanhaikwan. 
The remaining force of 220,000, equipped with 
some 216 pieces of artillery, was stationed in 
Manchuria, the regions about the city of Mukden 
being guarded by some 14,000 men with about 40 
pieces of artillery. At ordinary times the Chinese 
garrison within the walled city of Mukden is 3,000 
strong.) 
Against this force, the Japanese troops in Manchuria 
were in all not more than 10,400 in number. This force 
consisted of one division of about 5,400 strong, 16 pieces 
of artillery, and the Independent Railway Garrison 
of about 5,000, whereas the number of Japanese troops 
sanctioned by treaty is about 17,000. The duty of the 
Japanese military force in Manchuria is to guard the 
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leased Province of Kwantung and the South Manchuria 
Railway, extending over a distance of 1,100 kilometres. 
In performing their duties, they have the right to resort 
to military action in case of necessity. The safeguarding 
of some 200,000 Japanese subjects and 800,000 Koreans 
also must by necessity rec~ve their attention. 
Although the Japanese force on such a basis is quite 
adequate to deal with the bandits for whom Manchuria 
is notorious, they had quite a different proposition in 
taking action against the regular Chinese troops of 
decided numerical superiority. The situation of so 
precarious and perplexing a nature perforce demanded 
prompt action all along the line. No longer left in 
doubt as to the situation as regards the hostilities 
between the two sides, the Japanese military promptly 
rose to the occasion by concentrating the scattered troops 
at strategic points and by launching counter attacks 
wherever possible. Far outnumbered, it was tactical 
necessity for the Japanese force first to sweep off the 
Chinese troops in close prox~mity and next to station 
themselves at such points as to secure an open field for 
free manoeuvres. It is natural that the Japanese military, 
well alive to their own situation, should always have on 
hand plans carefully worked out on such principle. 
The main force of the 2nd Division at Liaoyang, 
largely consisting of the 16th Regiment of Infantry, was 
immediately set in motion and arrived at Mukden early 
in the morning of the 19th. They proceeded at once to 
the district on the east side of the walls. By 8 a.m. or 
thereabout the Chinese troops had completely been swept 
off that part of the town. Later joined by the Regiment 
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of Artillery (4 companies with 16 pieces of ordnance) 
from Haicheng, the main force of the 2nd Division 
turned upon the Chinese soldiers at Tungtaiying (about 
2 miles to the northwest of Mukden), completely driving 
them off by 2.30 p.m. 
Lieutenant-General Honjo, Commander of the K wan-
tung Military Force, in view of incoming reports, decided 
to send forth his main force to Mukden to assist in the 
campaign there. At 3 a.m. on October 19, he set out 
from Port Arthur for Mukden, requesting at the same 
time the Second Squadron of the Imperial Navy in port 
there to dispatch a part of its force to Yingkow for the 
protection of the Japanese there, and also sending a call 
to Korea for dispatch of reinforcements. 
Lieutenant-General Honjyo, arriving at Mukden at 
noon on the 19th, placed a section of the guard force 
at Tungtaiying, while the gendarmerie, with the support 
of an infantry contingent, were put on guard within the 
walled city. The main force was then concentrated 
within the railway zone near by. 
In the meantime in the direction of Changchun, the 
4th Regiment of Japanese infantry under Colonel Naga-
shima, found itself placed within a line of Chinese 
military force about 10,000 strong, armed with about 
40 pieces of artillery. This Japanese force, as a step in 
self-defence, began to direct its action against the Chinese 
contingent at Nanling with the object of clearing out 
their base at Kwanchengtze. The Japanese met with 
strong resistance in that direction, but with the assist-
ance of the First Battalion of the Independent Railway 
Garrison, they were able to drive off the Chinese from 
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Kwanchengtze after a long action, at about 11 a.m. 
and from Nanling about 3 p.m. With these points 
secured, the northern approach to the South Manchuria 
Railway line was practically closed to attack. 
Chinese Treachery at Nanling 
In the course of engagement at Nanling, the Chinese 
treacherously hoisted several white flags and drew the 
unsuspecting Japanese within 40 or 50 metres, when 
they opened fire, causing heavy damage to the advancing 
party. 
The casualties on the Japanese side in the fights at 
the above mentioned places were as follows :-
KILLED WOUNDED 
Non-eom. Non-rom. 
Officers officers & Officers officer.; & 
private!' privates 
Mukden & vicinity 0 2 7 19 
Changchun & vicinity. 3 63 3 73 
Total .................. 3 65 10 92 
III. SITUATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 20 
On September 20 the main portion of the 30th 
Regiment of Infantry and a battalion of field artillery 
arrived at Ch~tngchun from Port Arthur and Haicheng 
respectivelY. The Commander of the 2nd Division also 
moved his headquaTters to Changchun the same day to 
reinforce the line in that direction. 
In the city of !Grin general conditions began to show 
signs of restlessness among the Chinese soon after the 
outbreak of hostilities at Mukden. Stones began to be 
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thrown upon houses occupied by Japanese. Persistent 
calls for protection began to come from the Japanese 
residents there, of whom there were more than 900. 
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I There also came the report of the Kirin army moving 
westward against the Japanese troops. For protection of I 
the South Manchuria Railway on its flank and of the I 
1 Japanese population in Kirin, therefore, the Commander 
of the 2nd Division organized a mixed brigade and 
despatched it to the same city at about 10 a. m. 
September 21 by the Kirin-Changchun Railway. This 
manoeuvre removed a considerable portion of the force 
out of Changchun, but the thinned ranks were strengthened 
in the following afternoon by the arrival of the 15th 
Brigade of Infantry from Mukden. 
Situation along the Line 
In Kirin the Chinese soldiers were evidently thrown 
into panic at the advance of the Japanese troops. As a 
result of the parleys which General Hsi Ha, chief of the 
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staff, came out to conduct, the Japanese entered the 
city almost without any hostilities about 6 p. m., while 
the Chinese troops retreated to a distance of 20 Chinese 
miles (approximately 8 English miles). The 2nd Divi- I 
sion, having secured order in this part, again moved 
1 its main body of men back to Changchun to strengthen I 
the force there. I In the region of Chientao (Kanto) near the northern 
frontier of Korea, reports of the military clash in Mukden 
at once began to agitate the Chinese element, until an 
uprising took place on the 20th. At Lungtsingtsun the 
Chinese rabble went so far as to set fire to the engine-
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shed at the railway station. At Yenki a public school 
was destroyed by fire. Though the socialists are charged 
with these actions, a state of panic prevails throughout 
these regions. There are persistent rumours of impending 
massacre by Chinese. The Japanese and Korean popula-
tion has been sending out repeatOO calls to the Com-
mander of the Japanese Army in Korea, though such 
action bas been withheld to date. . 
The situation in Harbin has been no better, where 
the Japanese population numbers about 4,000. On the 
night of September 20 printed sheets were distributed in 
the city to stir up anti-Japanese propaganda. The next 
morning the local Japane e organized a volunteer militia 
for self defence. Urgent calls began to come from these 
Japanese and from the acting Consul-General there. On 
the night of September 21 about 9 p.m. bombs were 
thrown at our Consulate-General, the Bank of Chosen 
and a daily newspaper office. 
Although the Japanese residents not only in Harbin 
but elsewhere, find themselves under conditions of ex-
treme difficulty and danger, the Japanese Government, · 
desiring to localize the troubles, has decided not to send 
military force beyond the present line. In other words, 
the Japanese residents are to be called back in case of 
necessity. 
In the meantime, in the city of Mukden, which was 
completely deserted by all Chinese authorities soon after 
the fight, the Japanese military took temporary measures 
for maintenance of order. However, with the gradual 
return of peape, the conditions are being restored to 
what they were before. It is noteworthy that the 
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Chinese populace, who had always been victimized by 
Chinese military and other authorities, have found under 
Japanese guardi~tnship such a peaceful order of things as 
never seen before. Signs of peaceful restoration began 
to be seen the second day after the entry of the Japa-
nese. On September 21 many shops and commercial 
establishments began to open, with the financial mark t 
again in operation. 
As for the Army in Korea, a mixed brigade of some 
2,900 men was organized under Major-General Yo hi-
mara and concentrated at hingishu on September 19 at 
10 a.m., and held in readines to proceed to places to 
be garrisoned. At the same time two companies were 
sent out for advance reconnaissance and other duties. 
When the Kwantung Force had advanced to Kirin, 
the Commander of the forces at Shingishu, in view of 
the pressing situation, moved his troop , upon his ·own 
initiative, across the Yalu on September 21 at 1.20 p.m. 
to reinforce the Kwantung force. Arriving at Iukden 
about midnight, it replaced the main force of the 2nd 
Division, detailing out detachments to Chengtiatun and 
Shinmin the next day. 
IV. DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE TROOPS 
As a result of the military action and manoeuvres 
described above, hostilities practically came to a close. 
However, disbanded Chinese soldiers and bandits still 
continue to be active in the zone of the South Manchuria 
Railway, causing no small casualties on our side. There 
are indications of growing activity on their part. 
As for the interior parts of the country, there is no· 
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means of obtaining information. However, there is 
reason to think that considerable numbers of Korean 
settlers have been massacred. 
The disposition of the Japanese troops, as it stood at 
the beginning of October, is as given below, with little 
subsequent changes : 
In Mukden regions 
Headquarters of Kwantung Forces. 
The 39th Mixed Brigade. 
A part of this force is posted on guard at the rail-
way bridge at Liaoho, east of hinmin. 
In Ohangchun 1·egions 
Main force of the 2nd Division. 
A part of this force is dispatched to guard Cheng-
tiatun and neighbouring regions. 
In Kirin regions 
A part of the 2nd Division. 
In addition to these, the Independent Railway Garrison 
attends to the guarding of the South Manchuria Railway, 
with its headquarters at Ssupingkai. 
A glance at the map of Manchuria will show that 
Kirin is a point of great importance as a northern 
approach to the South Manchuria Railway, whence much 
damage might be inflicted. Chengtiatun and Shinmin 
are points through which the Chinese would have to pass 
in order to attack the same railway from the western side. 
The presence of the Japanese troops between these two 
poin ts, therefore, is a matter of absolute necessity for 
safeguarding the same railway, and signifies neither 
military occupation nor permanent disposition of troops. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the above review, it may be seen that the 
present Japanese military action in Manchuria began a.s 
an act strictly in self-defence. The general situation 
there made it necessary for the Japanese to extend such 
action to points essential for self protection. Promptness 
of action ie the first essential in moving small forces 
against forces of numerical superiority. Failure to fore-
stall would be fatal to a force fighting against great 
numerical odds, a fact to which the Japanese bad to be 
fully awake to assure their own success. Especially so 
wl1en the Japanese bad to operate with small troops 
scattered over regions three times wider than Japan 
Proper. 


APPENDIX 
Statement by Imperial Government 
The Imperial Government, in order to make clear its 
position as to the Manchurian question, issued on Sep-
tember 24 the following statement :-
" (1) The Japanese Government has constantly been 
exercising honest endeavours, in pursuance of its settled 
policy, to foster friendly relations between Japan and 
China and to promote jJ:J.e common prosperity and well-
being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct 
of officials and individuals of China for some years past 
has been such that our national sentiment has frequently 
been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have 
taken place one after another in the regions of Man-
churia and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in 
an especial degree, until the impression has gained 
strength in the minds of the Japanese people that 
Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated 
by China in a like spirit. Amidst an atmosphere of 
perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of 
Chinese troops destroyed the tracks of the South Man-
churia Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked 
our railway guards at midnight on September 18; a 
clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then 
took place. 
" (2) The situation became critical, as the number 
of the Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway 
did not then exceed 10,400, while there were in juxta-. 
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position some 220,000 Chinese soldiers. Moreover, 
hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed 
in jeopardy. In order to forestall an imminent disaster, 
the Japanese army had to act swiftly. Chinese soldiers 
garrisoned in the neighbouring localities were disarmed 
and the duty of maintaining peace and order wa left 
in the hands of the local Chinese organizations under 
the supervision of Japanese troops. 
"(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers 
were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There 
still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and 
a small number of men in a few other places, but no-
where does a state of military occupation, as such, exist. 
The reports that Japanese authorities have seized the 
customs of the salt gabelle office at Yingkou, or that they 
have taken control of the Chinese railways between 
Ssupingkai and Chengchiatun or between Mukden and 
Shinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our 
troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into 
Chientao any foundation in fact. 
" ( 4) The Japanese Government, at the special 
Cabinet meeting of September 19, took the decision that 
all possible efforts should be made to prevent the ag-
gravation of the situation, and instructions to that effect 
were given to tho Commander of tho Manchurian 
Garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched 
from Cbangchun to Kirin on September 21, but it was 
not with a view to military occupation but only for the 
purpose of removing a menace to tho South Manchuria 
Railway on its flank. As soon as that object has be n 
attained, the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn. 
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It may be added that while a mixed brigade of 4,000 
men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garri-
son, the total number of men in the garrison at present 
still remains within the limit set by treaty, and that 
fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way 
added to the seriousness of international situation. 
"(5) It Hlay be superfluous to repeat that the Japa-
nese Government harbours no territorial designs in 
Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects 
shall be enabled safely to engage in various peaceful 
pursuits and be given the opportunity of participating 
in the development of that land by means of capital and 
labour. It is the proper duty of a government •to 
protect rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the 
nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese 
Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway 
against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other 
light. The Japanese Government, true to its established 
policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Govern-
ment in order to prevent the present incident from 
developing into a disastrous situation between the two 
countries and to work out such constructive plans as 
will once for all eradicate cause for future friction. The 
Japanese Government would be more than gratified if 
the present difficulty could be brought to a solution 
which will give a new turn to the mutual relations of 
the two countries." 
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